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Psychosocial investigations of identity tend not to focus on the role of religion in 
the development of identity formation and the perception of self. When it is 
discussed in the literature a dichotomous response is discovered – there are 
those theorists who are positive about the role of religion and there are those 
theorists who are negative. Psychoanalytic theory, however, does discuss 
religion, religious identity and its relationship with intrapsychic conflict. The 
world’s preoccupation with Islamic fundamentalism, particularly since 9/11, has 
resurrected the need to examine the impact and influence that religion has on 
individual identity formation and the competition that then ensues between 
individual identity and collective, or group identity. The intention of this paper is 
not to dispute or dispel the legitimacy of religion but rather to investigate the 
processes that may contribute to ‘religious identity’ and how they may serve, 
and interfere with, the individual’s quest for identity. Psychoanalytic concepts, in 
particular attachment and narcissism, will be explored to further understand the 
role of religion in identity formation. The ‘attraction’ to religious fundamentalism 
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“These blessed, successful strikes are merely a reaction to events in our land…This blessed 
reaction came by the grace of God Almighty, showing very clearly that this haughty, 
domineering power, America…is soft. How quickly it fell from the sky, by the grace of God 






Psychosocial investigations of identity do not tend to focus on the role of religion in the 
development of identity formation and the perception of self. When it is discussed in the 
literature a dichotomous response is discovered – there are those theorists who are 
positive about the role of religion and there are those theorists who are negative 
(Pargament, 2002). Psychoanalytic theory, however, has a history of examining religion 
and religious affiliation in a critical way. 
 
Freud described religion as being a tool to create the illusion of the fulfilment of infantile 
wishes, the wishes for omnipotence and omniscience (1961). Other psychoanalytic 
theorists have been less critical of religion in general but concerned about the ability to 
potentially ‘misuse’ religion (Fromm, 1950). Other social scientists, such as Allport, are 
also concerned with the potential harm that can be caused by the misuse of religion. It 
thus appears that religion can be used in varying ways and degrees and the 
motivations for such usage should be examined. 
 
The atrocities of 9/11 have also thrust an aspect or expression of religion again into the 
face of the public – that of fundamentalism. This happens periodically and seems 
always to be associated with a disaster – The Davidians at Waco, the sarin gas attack 
in Tokyo, the mass suicide in Jonestown. All of these disasters have been as a result of 
a clash between a fundamentalist section of society that comes into confrontation with 
an opposing perception. This paper is an exploration into what processes may lead to 
the fundamentalist position and how this may impact on identity formation. 
 
This paper is also a preliminary investigation of the psychoanalytic concept of religion 
as a defensive organisation in trying to formulate an understanding of the attraction to 
fundamentalist interpretations of religion. It can also be seen as an adjunct to Gordon 
Allport’s thesis of intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation (Allport and Ross, 1967). 
 
 
Religion after 9/11 
 
 
If the world had not yet recognised that the attack on the Twin Towers and the 
Pentagon was not a battle for the right to count “God on my side” then the words of 
both Osama bin Laden and U.S. President George W. Bush that followed September 
11, 2001 left little room for doubt. 
 
“…after these great attacks that struck America at its heart in New York and 
Washington… [p]eople have been divided into two camps: those who support 
the attacks against American arrogance and tyranny, and those who condemn 
them…We cannot ignore this enmity between us and the infidels, since it is a 
doctrinal one…we must renounce the idolaters, infidels and heretics (against 
whom I seek God’s help)” – Osama Bin Laden, November 3, 2001 
“…All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see 
Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing 
"God Bless America."… please continue praying for the victims of terror and 
their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country…  Prayer has 
comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead… The 
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course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain…  Freedom and 
fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not 
neutral between them… In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, 
and may He watch over the United States of America” – George W. Bush, 
September, 20011 
 
That these two men believe in God and call for His help is evident. What is not so 
evident is the role that religion plays in the shaping of this conflict. Religion is one of the 
‘tools’ that is being used to justify reaction, response with calamity to the ‘other,’ as 
evidence that God is on ‘our’ side. 
 
 
Religion, Identity and Fundamentalism 
 
 
Religious affiliation or non-affiliation as the case may be, may be used by individuals as 
one of the elements by which to categorise and describe how the self is viewed – 
identity. Religion can provide the individual with a sense of belonging, a code of moral 
and ethical behaviour, comfort, but it can also be used or manipulated by the individual 
to justify prejudice, to rationalise sexism, to excuse assassination. It can be argued that 
it is not religion that is at the root of September 11, Jonestown or Waco but 
interpretation of religion that has been a catalyst for such disasters. Allport (1960) 
suggests that it is not whether one is religious that is of interest here but why one is so. 
 
Allport and Ross (1967) described the religious as falling into one of two categories: 
those with ‘intrinsic’ motivation and those with ‘extrinsic’ motivation. The intrinsically 
motivated individual will “find their master motive in religion” and will internalise the 
doctrines and beliefs so that “he lives his religion” (Allport and Ross 1967:434). The 
extrinsically motivated individual will utilise religion for his/her own needs and may “turn 
to God, but without turning away from self” (Allport and Ross 1967:434). Allport and 
Ross found from their research that those who are religious by way of intrinsic 
motivation were less prejudiced than those who were extrinsically religious (1967). This 
suggests that individuals who are somehow ‘using’ religion to meet their own needs 
view those with ‘difference’ as somehow threatening and anxiety provoking. In other 
words, the use of religion is part of a defensive organisation. 
 
This distinction, however, becomes problematic when trying to categorise religious 
fundamentalists, such as Osama bin Laden. At least superficially, Osama bin Laden 
‘lives’ his religion. Islam dictates how he dresses, what he eats, how many times a day 
he prays – it would be a brave person who could suggest that Islam is not an intrinsic 
part of his being. What is remarkable about bin Laden, and other members of 
fundamentalist religious groups, is the claim of absolutism and the perception that not 
only are those who differ wrong but intolerable. The question then becomes not what is 




Psychoanalysis, Religion and Identity 
 
 
This paper contends that the individual who cannot tolerate either existential 
uncertainty and/or the uncertainty of reality will be drawn to fundamentalism so that the 
unknowable and unthinkable are artificially made known and/or irrelevant or 




inconsequential. For the purposes of this paper fundamentalism will be discussed in 
terms of religious fundamentalism, although it could be argued that fundamentalism of 
any dimension employs similar delusional tactics to achieve the same status – the 
status of absoluteness. This paper explores the notion that religion can be employed as 
part of a defensive organisation that reduces psychic conflict, primarily the anxiety of 
the ‘unknown’, and return the individual to the mourned for state of narcissism. 
 
 
Fundamentalism and narcissistic injury 
 
 
All religions encompass idealism, whether this be for a text, a human representative of 
God or a mantra. This idealism involves the idea of perfection or a perfect state (Jones, 
2002). 
 
Freud described the dynamics of idealisation in 1914 and discussed the concept in 
conjunction with the notion of narcissism. Freud refers to “primary narcissism” as being 
manifested in the egocentrism of the infant. This idealised state is compromised and 
depleted when the child projects into the ‘other’ some of its idealised self love and 
omnipotence. To love someone else in an idealised sense is to bestow upon them 
some of the primary narcissistic components in order that he/she too may be perfect. 
“Since the amount of energy available is limited if it is given to the beloved, it is 
taken from oneself” (Jones 2002:14). 
 
“In the course of normal development, according to Freud, the inevitable 
intrusions of reality gradually undercut the infant’s narcissism, eventually 
leading to the acceptance of the objective world….Any remaining infantile 
illusions are a continuation of a primitive mental state and so represent the 
greatest danger to rationality and sanity. Such claims involve a retreat into the 
seductive and gratifying but ultimately destructive world of illusion” (Jones 
2002:15). 
 
For Freud, religion represents a wish for the individual to reconnect with this infantile 
state – a state where the individual and the beloved are ideal and loved. Maintaining 
the illusion of perfection is concomitant on defending against intruding realities which 
may sully and tarnish (Freud, 1914). 
 
Once the narcissism is shared between the other and the self there is an urgency to 
keep the two together – to pool the resources so that the individual need not 
experience the depletion. This then establishes a fusion – “I need you in order to feel 
whole again”. It is this state of dependency and maintenance of the illusion of 
perfection that Freud ascribes to religion. 
 
The wish to return to a time or state with whom the recollection thereof is associated 
with only blissful feelings is, according to Freud, one of the pitfalls of the human 
condition (Freud, 1914). It is only in this fantasised idealised state that uncertainties, 
anxieties, fears and conflict can truly be ‘annihilated’. The idealised state is thus a 
position where there are no doubts, no conflicts, and no anxieties, and where the self 
can be perceived as perfect. 
 
Psychoanalytic theories propose that the mind of the individual will attempt to restore 
the individual to a status of psychic equilibrium – a status that rids the individual of 
excessive and intolerable levels of psychic conflict or anxiety. Defense mechanisms 
are employed by the psychic apparatus to fend off that which cannot be tolerated by 
the individual. Defensive organisations are intra psychic structures that are constructed 
by the use of defense mechanisms to create a safe haven for the vulnerable self. But 
the ‘relationship’ between the self and the defensive organisation is not between two 
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distinct entities but rather a fusion of one with the other (Symington, 1993). The self 
becomes encased or engulfed by the defensive organisation which stymies individuality 
and autonomous functioning. This fusion then creates the illusion of a ‘perfect’, or 
idealised, self, so long as the fusion is not interrupted. Religion, or rather the use of 
religion as a defensive organisation, can thus be argued to be one way of conjuring up  
a perception of the self that is idealised because of the individual’s fusion with, as 
opposed to relationship to, it. 
 
The notion that religion facilitates the maintenance of the illusion of idealisation can be 
found in other psychoanalytic theories, such as attachment theory.  
 
 
Attachment theory  
 
 
Attachment theory, first proposed by John Bowlby, explains that attachment to a 
primary care giver is instinctive and involves the behaviours of proximity seeking and 
connectedness (Bowlby, 1973). The infant, secure in its attachment with the 
attachment figure, is able to explore the environment independently and return to the 
attachment figure as a secure base when reassurance is needed. It is also suggestive 
of the infant being able to integrate past experience and develop an internal 
representation of the attachment relationship – one that it is argued becomes the 
mental template for future intimate relationships. 
 
 In the same way, infants with insecure attachment do not have an internal 
representation of a reliable attachment relationship and feel less confident that the 
attachment figure will provide reassurance when necessary. This inhibits the ability to 
explore independently as there is no concept of the secure base to return to when 
necessary to reduce fear or stress. It is thought that one way the infant can defensively 
compensate for this is to develop an internal representation that is not reliant on an 
external secure base. Consequently an internal working model may develop that 
inhibits reliance or closeness to others in future relationships – thus there is an 
avoidance of intimacy in an attempt to reduce the need for dependence and the anxiety 
that creates. 
 
 The insecure-resistant child develops an internal representation of an unreliable base 
that does not allow for reduction in anxiety at all. Not only is there the threat of external 
threat and fear to contend with, there is also the fear that there may be no one to 
provide rescue. This results in the child perhaps clinging obsessively to the attachment 
figure for fear that it will not return after separation and thus renders the child unable to 
fully explore the external world for fear of abandonment. Thus, the internal ‘working 
model’ proposed by Bowlby consists of the experience and appreciation of the self, as 
mirrored by mother, and the experience and appreciation of the ‘other’ which is 
predicated on the infant’s internal experience of the primary attachment figure ( Bowlby, 
1973).  
 
Whilst primarily focused on the attachment system existent between infant and primary 
care giver, Bowlby maintained the psychoanalytic notion that early experience will have 
an impact and influence on an individual’s developmental future. Bowlby envisaged 
that the “attachment behaviour [categorizes] human beings from the cradle to the 
grave” (1973:129) and, I suggest, from earth to heaven. 
 
Holmes also introduces a progression in attachment theory – the idea of ‘non-
attachment’. The paradox of attachment, according to Holmes is that “to be securely 
attached we need to learn to be alone. Only in secure solitude do we discover who we 
really are…the aim of therapy is to move from static defenses to a dynamic movement 
between attachment and detachment “(1996:83- 84). The ability to exercise the smooth 
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and functional transition backwards and forwards between attachment and detachment 
leads to the development of what Holmes terms ‘nonattachment’ which he describes as 
the ability of the individual to enter into a relationship which is “non-possessive, 
nonambivalent, autonomous, freely entered into attachment, in which the [attachment 
figure] is held and cherished but not controlled [or controlling]” (1996: 84). Thus it is 
from this position of ‘nonattachment’ that an individual is able to be secure, 
autonomous, and capable of intimacy, yet independent. 
 
 
Attachment to God 
 
 
This paper argues that it is possible to see any theistic relationship with God, whatever 
form that takes, as an extension of the attachment system. The idea that God provides 
a safe haven, comforts, admonishes, listens attentively, is at least proximate in mind if 
not physicality, lends itself to viewing God as the ultimate attachment figure – ultimate 
because God is also viewed as omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. 
 
Freud and Bowlby both suggest that early relationships with parental figures will impact 
on an individual’s future relationships. Freud explicitly states that religion is an attempt 
to cope with a universal experience of helplessness, developmental injury to narcissism 
and recreation, through fantasy, of early experience with protective parental figures 
(Beit-Hallahmi, 1996; Freud, 1915). Bowlby does not specifically refer to God or religion 
but it is possible to see that the mechanisms utilised when talking of attachment 
systems are also evident when examining a relationship with a deity. 
 
The type of religious relationship or attachment to God can thus be argued to be a 
corollary of an individual’s early attachment experience. An individual who has 
experienced insecure attachment in his/her psychological history may use relationship 
or attachment with God to defend against the anxiety created by unavailable or 
unreliable attachment figures or as a way to defend against an intolerable narcissistic 
injury. This type of attachment history may render the individual incapable of attaining 
the position of what Holmes describes as non-attachment. It may render the individual 
incapable of tolerating uncertainty in both a practical and existential sense and thus 
religion, and God, may be used to restore, or create the illusion of absolute certainty 




Fundamentalism – the absolute attachment 
 
 
“For some the lure [of fundamentalism] is the heartfelt attempt to address an 
existential crisis…for others it is a more predictable consequence of economic 
disadvantage…a quest for moral certainty” (Schultz, 2005:9). 
 
An inability to tolerate uncertainty may drive a person to seek answers that will reduce 
the anxiety of not-knowing. Fundamentalism provides a position of unquestionable 
absoluteness and involves an idealisation that is essential to maintain. Thus any ‘out 
group’ poses a threat to the idealised absoluteness and needs to be defended against 
much like the original anxiety that led the individual to the absolute position in the first 
place. The fundamentalist view of the world tends to be polarised into right/wrong, 
good/evil and with that comes a tendency to condone violence against anyone who is 
perceived as a threat (Jones, 2002). 
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Fundamentalism however, loves company and the individual looking for absolute 
answers and absolute certainty will seek refuge in a system that provides the certainty 
of, or answers for, what is sought. Thus the individual’s relationship with God ceases to 
be open to personal interpretation but becomes prescribed by the collective’s, or 
system’s, view. This is where fundamentalist attachment to God differs from other 
religious expressions of attachments/relationships with God that are able to tolerate an 
individuality or personalisation of interpretation. 
 
Fundamentalist communities may erect psychological boundaries, such as specific 
dress code, or physical boundaries, living in a particular geographic location, to 
separate themselves from the ‘other’ and thus minimise the threat of impurification from 
those who do not share the group’s beliefs. The expectation of attack by the ‘other’ 
becomes part of the collective’s identity and is a manifestation of the good versus evil, 
right versus wrong dichotomy (Volkan, 2004).  
 
Fundamentalist communities tend to revolve around a proclaimed, or self-proclaimed, 
leader to whom the followers look to for rules and precepts and religious interpretation. 
This hierarchy is worth noting as it draws a distinction between the leader and the 
follower and allows an examination of the possible difference in the motivation and 
process that drives them. 
 
Osama Bin Laden is viewed by many as the spiritual leader of Al Q’aeda. This is not 
quite accurate as Al Q’aeda was originally set up by Abu Ubaida al Banshiri as a 
training camp for mujahidin who had volunteered to fight the Russians in Afghanistan 
and, in the words of Bin Laden, “the name grew from there” (2005:120). 
Bin Laden also does not proclaim himself a leader, but does declare himself a 
motivator to the call of jihad. 
 
“…I have a link to motivating these people [the attackers of 9/11]. That is 
clearly true…I was one of those that signed the juridical decree inciting 
our umma to jihad; I have been doing that for some years” (1998). And if 
one reads his speeches and interviews it is obvious that his 
interpretation of the Qur’an is regarded by him as being the only 
legitimate interpretation. Thus any who wish to align themselves with Bin 
Laden will not only need to accept his interpretation but interpret the 
Qur’an in this allegedly one true way. 
 
Although Bin Ladin is not a messianic leader in the same sense as, for example, 
Asahara from Aum Shinrikyo,  Jim Jones from the People’s Temple or David Koresh 
from the Davidians, he does share with them the possession of the ‘one truth’, the 
‘correct understanding’ of the holy text and perceived duty to preach his ‘truth’ to others. 
A leader of this ilk is linked with God in both a psychological and metaphysical sense 
as being the true interpreter of God, or God’s mouthpiece unto the world. This sets the 
leader up to be perceived by others as having ‘the answers’. The fundamentalist group 
thus has two parts, the leader who ‘knows’ God, whose own perceptions are as God 
wills it, and is thus fused with God in identity, and the follower who needs to dispel 
uncertainty by fusing with the leader. 
 
A subtle distinction between the leader and the follower can be expressed and 
understood with reference to the theories discussed. The leader has a need to be right 
– the possibility of not being ‘perfect’ is intolerable - so God is ‘used’ to restore the 
narcissism and sense of omnipotence that has been intolerably damaged. This returns 
the individual to a state of infantile bliss where once again the illusion of omnipotence 
and omniscience can prevail. The attachment system that is operating here is one 
where the ‘secure base’ must be eternally present and where the progression toward 
non-attachment cannot be attained. For the follower, it is uncertainty that cannot be 
tolerated and by merging with an omnipotent leader the anxiety of uncertainty is 
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avoided. This has similarities with the insecure – ambivalent style of attachment where 
the infant cannot function without the presence of the attachment figure, here being the 





This paper is a preliminary attempt to understand the lure of fundamentalism. It has 
provided a possible psychoanalytic interpretation for the mechanisms that may be in 
play for those who find the call to this position irresistible. Attachment style and 
intolerable narcissistic injury can both contribute to an understanding of why an 
individual may resort to an absolute, or fundamental, defensive organisation that 
reduces anxiety to a tolerable level. It also helps to explain why this fundamentalist 
position can offer no room for challenge or doubt and thus renders compromise 
impossible. Doubt and its manifest anxiety would return the individual back to the 
intolerable position from whence he/she came and so must be defended against at all 
costs. This also leads the defensive organisation to be paranoid with the expectation of 
a projected external threat which combines perceived victimisation with a self-justified 
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